They allow both firms and households to share risks." 4 Law, economics, finance, and accounting proceed from distinct perspectives with varied toolkits to achieve these goals. 5 At times, the perspectives and toolkits of one discipline can seem inaccessible or inadequate to scholars of another discipline. Economists and finance scholars, for example, often rely on abstract models, whereas legal scholars often engage more of the messiness of reality. Both approaches, however, can have merit. Also, economists and finance scholars often see pricing as an important proxy for efficiency. In contrast, legal scholars usually examine broader consequences. But these analyses can be complementary. Even though legal scholars rarely discuss pricing, they usually are familiar with efficiency concepts, including KaldorHicks efficiency and Pareto optimality. 6 Finally, economists and finance scholars have strong incentives to test their models empirically-an approach known as hypothetico-deductivism. Legal scholars engage less in empirical work and more in theory. 7 Theoretical inquiry, however, can be valuable, 8 whereas empirical inquiry can sometimes be misleading if it relies on imperfect modeling based on a flawed assumption or imperfect data. 5. Law and accounting, for example, help to reduce information-asymmetry costs by increasing transparency through disclosure-risk disclosure in the case of law, financial information disclosure in the case of accounting.
6. For example, Federal Reserve economists Tobias Adrian and Adam B. Ashcraft focus heavily on pricing. TOBIAS ADRIAN & ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 559: SHADOW BANKING REGULATION (2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr559.pdf. I have independently analyzed shadow-bank regulation using more generic market-failure terminology. Our analyses, however, are complementary. See infra note 31.
7. Even empiricists often rely on theory, however, to formulate hypotheses that are the basis of the models being tested. 8. Cf. Kevin A. Clarke & David M. Primo, Overcoming 'Physics Envy,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at SR 9 (observing that "theoretical models can be of great value even if they are never supported by empirical testing").
9. Cf. id. ("Rather than attempt to imitate the hard sciences, social scientists [such as economists] would be better off doing what they do best: thinking deeply about what prompts human beings to behave the way they do.").
The Symposium description also asks whether financial markets are still socially relevant institutions. Empirically, I believe the answer is yes: markets respond to actual societal needs. My talk assumes there is and will continue to be a significant need for financial capital. If that need diminishes, the question will be less important. And if nonfinancial-market sources of capital become less expensive than market sources, users of capital will vote with their feet. 10 In these inquiries, I would urge us to expand our focus beyond equity securities. The debt markets-which include markets for corporate bonds, commercial paper, covered bonds, and securitization-are increasingly important sources of financial capital 11 and are also the most rapidly changing financial markets.
12
III. ANALYSIS I now consider, in more depth, how the perspectives of law, economics, finance, and accounting provide distinct, yet overlapping, frameworks for analysis of the future of financial markets. 10 . Even banks obtain a significant portion of their funds from the financial markets. Steven 908-11 (2008) . Thus, it may be that the very decentralization inherent in the rise of certain shadow-banking markets may be putting pressure on traditional stock exchanges to move in the opposite direction and consolidate to survive.
A. A Legal Framework: Rethinking Market Regulation
Is financial regulation keeping pace with these financial market changes?
13 I will first focus on disintermediation and the resulting decentralization and fragmentation. Then, I will separately focus on increasing financial market globalization.
Disintermediation, Decentralization, and Fragmentation
Disintermediation, and the resulting decentralization and fragmentation of financial markets, are associated with the rise of shadow banking. Although the term is not well defined, "shadow banking" generally means the provision of financial products and services other than through traditional banking.
14 These products and services are provided by socalled "shadow banks," which are (non-traditional-bank) entities such as special-purpose entities (SPEs), finance companies, hedge funds, mutual funds, investment banks, and government sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
15 Some of these products and services are provided through financial markets. 16 Shadow banking can sometimes contribute to the social good. 17 Disintermediation, for example, removes the need for bank intermediation and middleman profit-taking. 18 Decentralization can increase consumer welfare by expanding the menu of funds and financial products available to individual investors, allowing them to tailor portfolios to their own preferences. 19 Moreover, decentralized markets can offer new funding options for firms lacking access to traditional bank credit and capital markets. 20 By reducing the size of firms, decentralization can also 13 . Recall that the financial market changes are set forth in the text accompanying notes 1-2, supra.
14. mitigate the "too big to fail" problem. And a decentralized financial system, in which losses are distributed among many small financial institutions, may also be more robust in the face of negative shocks.
On the other hand, shadow banking can sometimes be harmful to the social good. To the extent that shadow banking is motivated by regulatory arbitrage, 21 regulatory arbitrageurs might use deal structures with higher transaction costs than the regulated alternative, but that offer a net gain to parties because they avoid regulation. 22 Regulatory arbitrage also disadvantages market participants that lack the wealth, expertise, and (often) political connections to capitalize on arbitrage opportunities.
23
Shadow banking might also be harmful to the extent that it reflects a shift from more formal to less formal financial markets. 24 However, unlike traditional banking, which involves a simple process of deposit-taking and originating loans that are held to maturity, shadow banking employs a much more complicated process to achieve maturity transformation. At the deposit end of the shadow banking system are wholesale investors (providers of funds) using the repo market and money market intermediaries such as money market mutual funds (MMMFs) to provide short-term loans that are essentially withdrawable on demand. At the loan origination end formal markets can include transparency (which facilitates regulatory oversight and price discovery), quality control via minimum listing requirements, rapid error reporting and correction, dispute resolution mechanisms, and self-regulation by market participants.
25
Finally, shadow banking might be harmful to the extent that its decentralization makes it harder to control market failures. 26 Decentralized financial markets, for example, might increase the likelihood that systemic risk will be triggered by making panics, which often serve as the trigger that commences a chain of systemic failures, 27 more likely.
28
Shadow banking thus has the potential to create both benefit and harm. Empirically, we do not yet know which effect is likely to dominate. Any inquiry into financial regulation of shadow banking should therefore strive to examine, among other things, how to mitigate the potential harm while preserving the potential benefit. 29 Because the market failures associated with shadow banking are not all susceptible to legal solutions, 30 financial regulation will at best provide only partial solutions. . That makes it difficult for market participants to effectively process information. Cf. Awrey, supra at 9-10 (defining complexity as a function of information costs and bounded rationality). This allows risks to accumulate unnoticed and unchecked. Id. at 12. Awrey argues that these pathologies may lead not only to inefficient contracting among market participants, but also to "fraud, misconduct, and other opportunistic behavior" by financial institutions. Id. at 52. When hidden risks suddenly become apparent, market participants effectively panic. Id. at 27-28; see also Danielsson et al., supra at 4-6.
29. To that end, economists and finance scholars may want to study the balance, whereas legal scholars may want to study how shadow banking should be regulated if the balance is indeterminate. 
Financial Market Globalization
The other important legal inquiry is whether financial regulation is keeping pace with increasing financial market globalization. The limited international cooperation in response to the recent financial crisis highlights the fundamental tension between increasingly globalized financial markets and fragmented, state-centric market regulation. In that context, state-centric regulation not only is inefficient, it is also potentially anticompetitive-the latter insofar as nations engaging in that regulation may find their local markets diminishing. 32 This renews the question of whether a "supra-national regulatory regime in the financial services sector" is now necessary.
33 Professors Weber and Arner explain why such a regime may be needed:
[I]nternational financial regulation today is an accretion of institutions, organizations, international standards, and domestic laws and rules in many ways not designed to address the requirements of the continuing integration of domestic economies into an increasingly 31. Adrian & Ashcraft, supra note 6, essentially argue that (1) shadow banks are inherently fragile because they engage in maturity transformation, thereby exposing themselves to rollover risk without having central bank safety nets; (2) shadow banks therefore contracted for what was thought to be the equivalent: liquidity and credit put options with traditional banks; (3) because of neglected risks (such as failure to see correlations, underappreciated agency problems, and long intermediation chains that obscured information), traditional banks underpriced the risk of these liquidity and credit arrangements and thus entered into too many of them (which ultimately required tapping public funds to help avoid traditional bank failures); and (4) regulatory reform of shadow banking should therefore focus on increasing the transparency, thus enabling more appropriate pricing of shadowbank liquidity and credit arrangements. I have argued, in contrast, that regulation cannot correct all the market inefficiencies. See Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 22 and accompanying text ("Regulation can help to control, but cannot completely eliminate those failures."). Therefore, regulation aimed at increasing transparency and enabling more accurate pricing is necessary but insufficient. We also need to focus on how regulation can help to mitigate the harmful consequences of mispricing and systemic failure resulting from shadow banking.
32. However, I leave open the possibility that state-centric regulation can be crafted to signal integrity and reliability, thereby making local markets more competitive. In designing an international standards framework for financial regulation, scholars have suggested incorporating goals of financial development in addition to financial stability-the latter being the existing focus. 35 To this end, they point to the European Union regulatory model, which focuses on both of those goals. 36 As part of its effort to build a common market for financial services, the European Union implemented a regime based on mutual recognition of national financial laws and regulations premised on a set of agreed minimum standards for regulation.
37
This approach is best exemplified by the European Union's single passport system, which permits financial services companies to operate across borders by branching in any E.U. state as long as certain minimum regulatory criteria are met. 38 The passport system has increased crossborder competition in financial services while maintaining a baseline level of stability through regulation, and it ultimately is paving the way for more ambitious regulatory harmonization. 39 Ironically, there is a degree of covariance in the financial regulation I have discussed. To the extent it increases opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, 40 efforts by international regulators "to strengthen the [global] financial system by tightening bank rules may inadvertently serve to boost opportunities for unregulated or 'shadow' financial players." 41 Next, consider the future of financial markets from the perspective of economics.
B. An Economic Framework: Rethinking Market Efficiency
From the perspective of economics (and, to some extent because of the scholarly overlap, finance), consider how the financial market chang- es are affecting efficiency. 42 One might broadly ask, for example, whether the rise of shadow banking increases or reduces efficiency. I have already observed, however, that although shadow banking has the potential to create both benefit and harm, we do not yet know which effect is likely to dominate. Further empirical inquiry will be needed.
There are, however, more limited efficiency-related questions that might be easier to test. For example, the financial market changes have been spurring the creation of complex new financial products.
43 Does the advent of new financial products itself increase efficiency? Some scholars believe, contrary to rational expectations models, that new financial products may not increase efficiency because investors in such products might ignore "improbable risks." 44 Scholars also have questioned whether investors really understand all of the risks. 45 Indeed, to the extent new financial products, which usually are crafted by skilled financial engineers, 46 are more complex than existing products, one might question whether they are inherently riskier-if due only to the limited capacity of market participants to fully understand them.
47
If one accepts this critique of financial innovation-that new financial products can contain inherent, largely unrecognized risks-it raises the question of whether ex ante regulation of new financial instruments might be preferable to the current ex post regulatory approach. I briefly consider this question, reverting to the perspective of financial regulation. 42 . Although there are numerous technical definitions of efficiency, most observers considering the topic of financial innovation seem to assume a relatively basic economic definition: maximizing the total welfare of market participants based on the measurable costs and benefits of the financial product, defined by reference to price. 47. I do not claim that complex new financial products are necessarily systematically riskier than investors think. I am simply observing that new financial products that are not fully understood by investors could increase the error of risk estimation both on the upside and the downside.
Several academic observers have proposed just such an ex ante regime in which new, complex financial instruments would be subject to a mandatory approval process. 48 Professor Saule Omarova proposes a plan that, while not barring any financial activities, would impose a duty on innovators to show (1) that their proposed product has economic utility; (2) that they have the ability to manage the risks of the product; and (3) that their product does not create an "unacceptable risk of increasing systemic vulnerability."
49 Professors Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl offer a more stringent preapproval plan that targets those financial derivatives that decrease social utility by promoting speculation. 50 In their framework, a "Financial Products Regulator" would have the power to "approve, reject, or approve with certain conditions" financial products submitted to its approval process. 51 Professor Edward Kane refers to this type of approach as "the FDA model applied to finance," 52 a comparison Omarova, Posner, and Weyl make directly in their papers.
53
Another efficiency-related question is whether the financial market changes create externalities by imposing uncompensated costs on taxpayers. Professor Kane makes this argument, referring not to "shadow" but to what he calls "shadowy" banking. 54 The problem, he contends, is that certain new financial market instruments, especially in the repo and securitization markets, "trade for substantial periods of time as if they carried zero counterparty risk" because investors believe that government "will be afraid not to absorb all or most of the losses [ Yet another efficiency-related question concerns credit bubbles. There is some empirical evidence that credit bubbles often precede financial crises. 57 Economists therefore might wish to study whether credit bubbles can be recognized and deflated early, before they trigger a crisis.
Finally, the recent financial crisis highlighted behavioral challenges to ideas of market efficiency. Humans have bounded rationality, following the herd in their investment choices and over-relying on heuristics, such as rating-agency ratings. Market participants are also prone to panic. And, due to optimism and availability biases, we are unrealistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events with which we have no recent experience, devaluing the likelihood and potential consequences of those events. 58 We need to better understand how to achieve market efficiencies notwithstanding these and related cognitive limitations.
C. A Finance Framework: Rethinking Market Organization
From the perspective of finance, consider how the financial market changes are affecting market organization. There appear to be at least two ways: facilitating the funding of long-term capital needs from shortterm market sources, and fragmenting markets. 59 56. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). To this end, Kane suggests-although it is as yet unclear how to effectuate his suggestion-that taxpayers should hold a stake in firms equal to the stake held by the firm's shareholders. Id , the tendency to analyze a situation wrongly because of inadequate ability to interpret complex information; incentive bias, the tendency to see the world in accordance with their own self-interest; and asymmetry bias, the tendency to rely on preformed and fixed ideas, judgments, or attitudes. Id. at 813-18. During the financial crisis, actors in complex organizations enabled the spread of systemic risk by failing to properly acquire, process, transmit, and implement key risk-related information. Id. at 810.
59. My colleague, Bill Brown, contends that leverage exists not only directly (through the traditional means of borrowing) and indirectly (through derivatives), but also "infinitely," by which he refers to commodities-futures exchanges where positions are not margined at their intraday maximums, but are only margined at the net open position at the close of the day. This unfettered leverage allows unnecessary high-frequency and proprietary trading risk. To address this market risk, he would impose margin and capital restrictions on maximum intraday commodities-futures positions. I
have not yet independently examined this risk, but questions may include how to measure, monitor, and control the risk on a real-time basis.
Short-Term Funding of Long-Term Capital Needs
A potential liquidity discontinuity occurs when markets provide short-term funding of long-term capital needs. One might conceptualize this as a market organization problem insofar as ideally organized markets should provide funding that matches the maturities of the needs. In reality, though, the interest rate on short-term debt is usually lower than that on long-term debt because, other things being equal, it is easier to assess an obligor's ability to repay in the short term than in the long term.
60 Long-term debt is thus (again, other things being equal) riskier. Firms therefore sometimes prefer cheaper short-term funding even though that potentiates a liquidity discontinuity-that the firm will be unable to "roll over" the short-term debt by borrowing new debt to repay the maturing debt. This preference ideally should reflect the firm's belief that it will have little problem in rolling over the short-term debt. To some extent, however, it might reflect a calculated externality, in that the firm saves real money through short-term borrowings whereas, in the unlikely event the firm cannot roll over the debt, at least part of the harm from the firm's default will impact third parties. 61 Thus, even if the firm perfectly understands the risk of funding its long-term projects with short-term debt, it may not pay the full cost of that mismatch.
62
For example, Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick argue that shadow banking, in the form of repo lending, 63 might increase systemic risk 60. Short-term interest rates may also be lower than long-term rates because the term structure of interest rates (also known as the yield curve) is usually increasing despite the fact that it represents the risk-free rate for various horizons. E-mail from Simon Gervais, Assoc. Professor of Fin., Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Duke Univ., to author (Apr. 14, 2012) (on file with author).
61. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 206 ("[T]he externalities of systemic failure include social costs that can extend far beyond market participants. Thus, market participants will not want to internalize those costs and will take an insufficient amount of care to prevent them. As a result, there is a type of tragedy of the commons, in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource, whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of persons." (citations omitted)).
62. If investors in the short-term funding fully understand the rollover risk, they may demand that it be priced into the firm's cost-for example, charging the firm an incrementally higher interest rate, or conditioning their funding on the firm purchasing a liquidity facility (which would facilitate the rollover if the firm is unable to do so). Because of asymmetric information between the firm and its investors, however, the investors may not fully understand that risk.
63. Repo lending refers to a transaction in which Party A advances money to Party B in exchange for securities with an agreement, termed a repurchase agreement, that Party B will subsequently repay Party A and get back the securities. One way to view the transaction is as a loan by Party A to Party B collateralized by the securities. Another way to view the transaction is as a purchase of the securities by Party A with a simultaneous agreement by Party B to subsequently buy back the securities. through short-term funding of long-term capital needs. 64 In the recent financial crisis, the precipitous decline in value of mortgage-backed securities used as collateral for short-term repo loans prompted repo lenders to demand additional collateral. 65 Gorton and Metrick maintain that these demands approximated bank runs-in which panicked depositors withdraw funds from their banks-to the extent bank repo-borrowers were forced to sell assets to generate the additional collateral.
66 These forced asset sales also further depressed asset prices, creating a shock that spread rapidly through the interconnected financial system, impacting shadow-banking entities (like structured investment vehicles and money-market mutual funds) that relied on short-term debt.
67
Financial market organization should be rethought to help mitigate externalities caused by short-term funding of long-term capital needs. The problem, however, does not arise from shadow banking per se. Although some, including Gorton and Metrick, may regard short-term funding as a central characteristic of shadow banking, shadow banking can (and does) provide both short-and long-term funding, 68 and even traditional banks fund themselves through short-term deposits (with resulting liquidity discontinuities being the real bank runs). 66. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 64, at 279. 67. Id. at 279-80 (observing that structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that relied on shortterm debt to finance purchases of asset-backed securities and money-market mutual funds were forced to liquidate assets to repay panicked investors who redeemed their shares). I have made similar arguments in Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 30, at 232-33 (discussing information uncertainty through the example of mark-to-market accounting and margin calls by broker-dealers).
68. In securitization transactions, for example, the issued securities often have long-term maturities.
69. The so-called Volcker Rule, which would limit a systemically important firm's right to make short-term investments for its own account, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2010) (codifying steps to implement rules limiting proprietary trading), addresses a somewhat related "short-term" question. One might be skeptical, though, of any such paternalistic regulation aimed at protecting a sophisticated financial firm from itself. The only scenario where that type of regulation might be justified is where firms can externalize systemic-risk costs, but there are more direct and arguably effective ways to require firms to internalize those costs. See Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 30 (proposing a privatized systemic risk fund for that purpose); see also infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
Short-term funding of long-term capital needs is thus a fundamental problem of the financial system. 70 In the recent financial crisis, for example, it is alleged that "substantial contraction" in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last five months of 2007 "played a central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-related assets into a global financial crisis." 71 Whether or not one agrees with that claim, empirical research indicates that this contraction was caused by investor concern that issuers of the ABCP did not have sufficient liquidity to cover shortfalls from maturing mortgage loans. 72 Issuers with "full liquidity support" did not appear to experience the same contraction. 73 Questions for further inquiry might therefore include whether financial markets could be organized better to provide liquidity to address discontinuities. 74 
Market Fragmentation
There is an extensive ongoing debate about the relative merits of financial market fragmentation and consolidation. Even for equity securities, approximately 30% of all trades are being executed outside of stock exchanges. 75 Professors O'Hara and Ye found, empirically, that these "fragmented stocks generally have lower transaction costs and faster execution speed" than stock traded on formal exchanges, 76 although the "specific effects of this fragmentation differ across firm sizes, and it differs as well for NYSE-listed and Nasdaq-listed firms."
77 They conclude that "market quality, as measured by effective spreads, is not harmed by market fragmentation." 78 In contrast, however, Professors Hendershott and Jones find that market fragmentation causes a reduction in transparency, worsening overall price discovery. 79 The net impact of market fragmentation is thus far from resolved.
D. An Accounting Framework: Rethinking Financial Information Disclosure
As mentioned, financial information disclosure is primarily the province of accounting. I broadly framed the inquiry by asking whether existing accounting rules and principles adequately disclose financial information, especially given increasingly decentralized and fragmented financial markets and mismatched funding, and whether those rules and principles should be harmonized for global financial markets. Within that broad inquiry, 80 let me attempt to identify two specific concerns: fair value accounting and special purpose entities. Thereafter, I will digress by examining the limits of disclosure more generally.
First, the recent financial crisis has unleashed a vigorous debate over the efficacy of fair value accounting (FVA), popularly known as "mark to market." Many have criticized FVA for putting artificial pressure on firms' balance sheets in times of market turmoil by forcing firms to recognize short-term fluctuations in the value of assets with long maturities. 81 Others note the difficulty of valuing assets for which there is not a transparent, liquid market. 82 Although accurately capturing the value of assets held by a firm, and communicating that information to inves- tors and regulators in a relevant format, are crucial functions of accounting, 83 there is no perfect method that always accomplishes these goals. 84 Trade-offs are inherent in setting accounting standards. 85 Accounting scholars may wish to continue studying and debating FVA and its tradeoffs (including in a global context), identifying and weighing FVA's costs and benefits, and analyzing when and how it should be applied. 86 Second, accountants have been struggling with how to disclose financial information about special-purpose entities (SPEs). 87 SPEs are at the heart of shadow banking, which can cause financial market decentralization and fragmentation. 88 In that context, one of the central questions is how to determine whether SPEs and their liabilities should be consolidated, for accounting (and thus public reporting) purposes, with their sponsoring firms. The answer can have profound consequences because non-consolidation means that an SPE's liabilities are not reflected on the sponsoring firm's balance sheet-commonly referred to as off-balancesheet financing. Yet the sponsoring firm might ultimately feel compelled to backstop those liabilities, even if it is not legally obligated to do so. For example, at the outset of the recent financial crisis many banks backstopped their affiliated "structured investment vehicle" SPEs solely to protect the banks' reputations. 89 This heightened the crisis by unexpectedly stripping away bank assets.
90
I also want to say a few words about the limits of disclosure generally, beyond accounting for financial information. 91 Disclosing risks traditionally has been viewed under U.S. and most foreign securities laws as the primary financial market-regulatory mechanism.
92 It works by reducing, if not eliminating, asymmetric information among market players, making the risks transparent to all. Empirical evidence suggests that investors place a significant value on effective disclosure and react negatively to instances of fraud, even when such fraud impacts cash flows minimally. 93 But the efficacy of disclosure is limited by the increasing complexity of financial markets and market transactions. In the recent financial crisis, for example, there is little question that virtually everything regarding complex mortgage-backed securities was disclosed. Yet many sophisticated institutional investors bought these securities based primarily on their ratings, without fully understanding them.
94
There are a host of reasons why this occurred. Analysts overrelied on heuristics such as rating-agency ratings. Analysts and investors followed the herd in their investment choices. Conflicts of interest were driven by short-term management compensation schemes (such as paying yearly bonuses based on deals booked during the year, even though a deal could underperform in the long term), especially for technically sophisticated secondary managers. These conflicts are unlike the traditional HSBC Holdings PLC and WestLB AG to backstop their SIVs, notwithstanding that doing so reduced Citigroup's capital ratio (which regulators monitor to gauge its ability to withstand losses on bad loans) and also caused Moody's to lower Citigroup's long-term credit rating. Id focus of scholars and politicians on conflicts between senior managers and shareholders. The retention by underwriters of residual risk portions may have fostered false confidence in investors, in effect creating a "mutual misinformation" problem. By signaling their (unjustified) confidence in the securities being sold, the underwriters inadvertently misled investors into buying those securities. 95 Requiring increased disclosure might therefore be appropriate, but only if that disclosure is better directed at the audience's understanding and is properly supplemented-such as by addressing the conflicts of interest that are inherent in short-term compensation structures, especially of secondary managers. 96 Requiring enhanced internal controls that cabin managers' discretion in reporting could also improve the quality of financial disclosures. Some empirical evidence supports the link between internal controls on disclosure quality, though only at the cost of reduced conservatism in financial disclosure due to managers' lack of discretion in reporting. 97 Further empirical inquiry may be merited.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
I have attempted to help frame an inquiry into what we, as scholars, should try to rethink about financial markets. To that end, I have focused primarily on the ways in which financial markets have been changing. The fact that financial markets tend to change over time not only reinforces the importance of this symposium; it also indicates the importance of periodically reexamining these markets. 98 In an arguably analogous 95. See generally Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 30. Furthermore, in the context of systemic risk, individual market participants who fully understand that risk will be motivated to protect themselves but not the system as a whole. See supra note 61. The solution to that dilemma is to try to require market participants to internalize this systemic externality. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. At the very best, internal controls can merely make it more difficult to make bad decisions. Internal controls cannot prevent fraud, but they likely can make fraud easier to detect and more difficult to carry out. What internal controls do not do is change the incentives. While they may have a second-order effect of discouraging certain behaviors by increasing oversight, controls do not eliminate these behaviors.").
98. Cf. Turner, supra note 81, at 35-36 (observing that "it is the nature of modern global finance[] that it continually mutates to create new risks and new interconnections [and to] inform that response we need to keep the system under permanent surveillance").
context, for example, the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) periodically reexamines commercial law in the United States in light of changing commercial practices. 99 As a result, the UCC is frequently amended to respond to commercial reality, 100 making it one of America's most continuously successful business-law statutes.
101 Perhaps financial market changes should be periodically reexamined too.
Also, throughout the address I have mentioned the potential for financial market changes to trigger systemic collapses. The very increase in the size and significance of financial markets as a source of capital is making these markets more central to systemic concerns. In other contexts, I have argued for responses such as a market liquidity provider of last resort to help stabilize panicked financial markets 102 and a systemic risk fund to help internalize systemic costs and motivate crossmonitoring. 103 In the United States, there are strong precedents for requiring the private sector to contribute to funds that would help to internalize externalities. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for example, requires member banks to contribute to a Deposit Insurance Fund to ensure that depositors of failed banks are repaid. In a systemic risk context, the likelihood that systemically important firms-including those that believe they are "too big to fail"-will have to make additional contributions to a systemic risk fund to replenish bailout monies should motivate those firms to monitor each other and help control each other's risky behavior. 104 Professor Whitehead similarly argues that financial regulation needs to be fundamentally rethought with a view to directly addressing systemic risks within financial markets. Regulators, he contends, "must begin to address whether there are now market-based risks-beyond any single intermediary-that raise the same systemic concerns that underlie bank and insurance regulation, a prospective look that differs from the reactive process that has characterized much of financial regulation to date." 105 He believes, as I do, that the systemic risk regulations proposed by the Obama administration (and later adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act) do not go far enough in this direction because they focus more on systemically important financial firms than on financial markets.
